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Abstract: Aesthetics is the part of contemporary academic philosophy that is
concerned with art, beauty, criticism, and taste. As such, it must address meta-
physical issues (distinguishing works of art from other kinds of things), epistemic
problems (the experience of beauty, the standards of critical judgment), and ques-
tions of value (the difference between good and bad taste). This makes it difficult
to present a coherent account of the subject matter of aesthetics. In this article, I
argue that this difficulty is the result of ambiguities and contradictions that arose
in disputes about the relationship between the science of aesthetics, the critique of
taste, and the philosophy of art in German philosophy during the eighteenth and
early nineteenth century. By reconstructing the history of these debates, I hope to
shed new light on the origins of aesthetics as a discipline and to explain why its
subject matter and status within philosophy are still so difficult to define.
I. INTRODUCTION
Aesthetics is the part of contemporary academic philosophy that is concerned
with art, beauty, criticism, and taste. As such, it must address metaphysi-
cal issues (distinguishing works of art from other kinds of things), epistemic
problems (the experience of beauty, the standards of critical judgement), and
questions of value (the difference between good and bad taste). It is not al-
ways clear whether all these things really fit together or how to explain their
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relation to one another, which may (partly) explain the marginal status of
aesthetics within contemporary academic philosophy.1
There are important discussions of the subject matter and methods asso-
ciated with aesthetics in works of ancient and medieval European philosophy,
though it is not clear that they can really help us understand aesthetics or
its place within contemporary philosophy. Ancient and medieval philoso-
phers simply did not recognize aesthetics as a part of philosophy, so it would
be anachronistic to attribute to them any understanding of aesthetics at all.
Consider, for example, Plato’s discussions of poetry and painting in dialogues
like the Republic. Plato is concerned in these dialogues with metaphysics,
moral psychology, and pedagogy – though he did not recognize these sub-
jects as parts of philosophy either.2 Aristotle regarded rhetoric and poetics
as productive sciences like agriculture or medicine. His Poetics explains how
to compose and perform dramatic poems in the same way that agriculture
explains how to grow crops and medicine helps to make a body healthy.3
The concept of beauty was also important for medieval philosophers like Au-
gustine, Pseudo-Dionysius, and Thomas Aquinas, though their concerns were
metaphysical and theological rather than aesthetic.4 For these philosophers,
beauty was one of the names of God – along with goodness, light, love, and a
host of others.5 It was also counted among the transcendentals by scholastic
philosophers, who took everything God created to be one, true, good, and
beautiful.6 Contemporary philosophers can and should study ancient and
medieval theories of art and beauty, as well as treatments of these subjects
in different philosophical traditions, throughout the world, from antiquity to
the present. Yet they should not impose on them a framework that is not
their own. Effacing the differences between them and treating them all as
contributions to aesthetics, understood in the sense in which it is understood
in contemporary academic philosophy, would be both anachronistic and im-
perialistic.
Instead of treating aesthetics as a kind of universal, perennial philosophy
that encompasses everything anyone might have thought or said about art,
beauty, criticism, and taste, at any time and in any part of the world, I
think it is best to regard aesthetics as a part of a historically specific way of
distinguishing and classifying the ‘parts’ of philosophy within the system of
academic philosophy. ‘Aesthetics’ was first identified as a part of philosophy
in Germany in the eighteenth century, though, even within this more specific
context, we must be careful to avoid anachronism.7
When Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten introduced aesthetics as a new
science and a new part of philosophy in his dissertation in 1735, its subject
matter was much more narrowly defined than it is today.8 Baumgarten also
intended aesthetics to perform a very specific function within his philosoph-
ical system. The way he defined his new science and the role he assigned
it turned out to be controversial, so the subject matter as well as the sta-
tus of aesthetics were soon contested by other German philosophers. Kant
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thought Baumgarten was wrong to suggest that aesthetics could be a science
of the perfection of sensible cognition. He presented his own aesthetics as a
critique of taste that was primarily concerned with feelings of pleasure and
displeasure. Schelling, Hegel, and the German Idealists thought Kant was
wrong to limit aesthetics to the critique of taste and rejected his emphasis
on feeling. Instead, they advocated a more ambitious philosophy of art, with
profound metaphysical implications. Their disagreements seem to have de-
fined the terms in which academic philosophers from the nineteenth century
to the present would understand aesthetics – for better or for worse.
It is my hope that, by reconstructing the history of the controversies
surrounding the introduction of aesthetics as a new part of philosophy in
Germany in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, we will begin to see
how the science of aesthetics, the critique of taste, and the philosophy of art
were initially presented as mutually exclusive alternatives, which were then
conflated with one another, and later came to be consolidated into the part of
contemporary philosophy that we still call aesthetics – despite the ambiguities
and contradictions that arise from treating all of the metaphysical, epistemic,
and value theoretical problems that aesthetics is supposed to address as if
they belonged to a single part of philosophy. Understanding the controversies
about the subject matter and status of aesthetics within philosophy may not
clarify all of these ambiguities or resolve all of these contradictions, but they
can help us appreciate the complexity and specificity of the conditions under
which parts of philosophy emerge and systems of philosophy are articulated,
so that we can avoid some of the anachronisms that make aesthetics seem as
if it were a part of universal and perennial philosophy.
II. THE SCIENCE OF AESTHETICS
I have already mentioned that Baumgarten introduced aesthetics as a new
science and a new part of philosophy for the first time in his dissertation,
which he defended at the University of Halle in 1735 and published in 1736.9
Most of Baumgarten’s Reflections are devoted to the elaboration and defence
of the definition of poetry that he presents at the beginning of his dissertation.
There he says poetry is ‘perfect sensible discourse’.10 Poetry is a ‘discourse’
because it involves ‘a series of connected series of words which designate con-
nected representations’.11 It is a form of ‘sensible’ discourse, because the
representations that are connected with one another in poetry are ‘received
through the lower part of the cognitive faculty’ and are, as such, ‘sensible’
representations.12 Sensible discourse is perfect, according to Baumgarten,
when the representations it contains ‘favor the apprehension and awakening
of sensible representations’ – in other words, when they command our atten-
tion and enliven our faculty of sensibility.13 Baumgarten says that the rules
for perfecting sensible discourse are contained in the science of ‘philosophical
poetics’, but in the closing paragraphs of his dissertation he notes that this
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science presupposes another science, since it depends on the ‘lower cognitive
faculty’ of the poet and, thus, on ‘sensible cognition’.14 Baumgarten proposes
to call the science of sensible cognition ‘aesthetics’, in keeping with ‘the Greek
philosophers and Church fathers’, who ‘have already carefully distinguished
things perceived and things known’.15 Logic would be the science of philo-
sophical truths known through the higher cognitive faculties of understanding
and reason, while aesthetics would be the science of things perceived through
the lower cognitive faculty of sensibility. The task of this science would be
to ‘improve the lower cognitive faculties, and sharpen them, and apply them
more happily for the benefit of the whole world.’16
Baumgarten continued to develop and elaborate his new science of aes-
thetics in works like his Metaphysics and Philosophical Letters, and in the
two volumes of his Aesthetics that he was able to publish before his early
death in 1762.17 A systematic treatment of Baumgarten’s new science was
also presented in the three-volume Foundations of All Beautiful Sciences by
his former student and friend Georg Friedrich Meier, who managed to publish
his Foundations even before the first volume of Baumgarten’s Aesthetics ap-
peared. There are many curious and noteworthy features of these works, but,
for now, I would like to emphasise that they all call aesthetics a science. In the
Reflections on Poetry, Baumgarten identifies aesthetics as both ‘the science
which might direct the lower cognitive faculty in knowing things sensibly’
and ‘the science of perception’.18 In the Metaphysics, he describes aesthet-
ics as ‘the science of knowing and presenting with regard to the senses’.19
In the Philosophical Letters, he says aesthetics is the ‘science’ that contains
‘the foundations of all of the beautiful sciences, presented systematically’.20
In the Aesthetics, Baumgarten defines aesthetics as ‘the science of sensible
cognition’.21 Finally, in the Foundations, Meier calls aesthetics ‘the science
. . . that concerns sensible cognition and its general characteristics’.22 Neither
Baumgarten nor Meier explain what it means for aesthetics to be a science in
any of the works they devoted to the subject. Still, their conception of science
is consistent with the definition Baumgarten provides in his Acroasis Logica,
where science is said to involve ‘certain cognition from things that are cer-
tain’.23 This definition is perfectly consistent with medieval and early modern
conceptions of science, which often stressed the certainty and demonstrabil-
ity of scientific knowledge. Yet it would seem, from the ‘Prolegomena’ to the
first volume of the Aesthetics, that Baumgarten expected some philosophers
to regard a science of aesthetics with suspicion. Anticipating their objections
to his new science, Baumgarten argues that the subject matter of aesthetics
is different from and presupposed by poetics, rhetoric, and criticism; that
sensible cognition is worthy of study; and that the lower cognitive faculty
of sensibility should be cultivated rather than suppressed. Taken together,
these arguments are meant to demonstrate that a science of aesthetics is both
possible and necessary.
The most important objections Baumgarten anticipates concern the sub-
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ject matter of his new science. He thought philosophers would reject aes-
thetics as a science of sensible cognition, because of a peculiarity of the
Leibnizian-Wolffian rationalism that was prominent in Germany at the time.
Elaborating on the new standard of truth that Descartes had proposed in his
Discourse on Method and Mediations on First Philosophy, namely, the clarity
and distinctness of ideas, Leibniz and Wolff had argued that sensible cogni-
tion was necessarily confused and that intellectual cognition was defined by
its distinctness. Wolff thought sensations could be rendered clearer and more
distinct through analysis, which would identify and distinguish the properties
of an object and the predicates contained in its definition. Yet he still used the
confusion and distinctness of sensible and intellectual cognition to distinguish
the lower and higher cognitive faculties in his empirical psychology.
Curiously, Baumgarten accepts the Leibnizian-Wolffian distinction be-
tween confused sensible cognition and distinct intellectual cognition; yet he
does not conclude from this distinction that there can be no science of con-
fused sensible cognition or that the goal of scientific inquiry is to render
confused sensible cognition more distinct through analysis. Instead, Baum-
garten insists that confused sensible cognition has its own perfection, which
is different from the perfection of distinct intellectual cognition. In the Meta-
physics, he associates this perfection with extensive clarity – a concept he had
introduced to distinguish the perfection of poetic representation from the per-
fection of logical representation in his dissertation. The idea is that, while
logical representations become clearer through analysis, which renders their
predicates more distinct, poetic representations become clearer when they are
combined with additional confused representations, which makes them clearer
by increasing the number of connections they have with other representations
without making them any less confused or more distinct. In the Reflections
on Poetry, Baumgarten indicates that extensively clear representations are
more poetic than other representations, while, in the Metaphysics, he suggests
that extensively clear representations are ‘stronger’ and ‘livelier’ than other
cognitions.24 Baumgarten abandons the concept of extensive clarity in the
Aesthetics, where he identifies beauty as the perfection of sensible cognition.
‘Beauty’, Baumgarten says, ‘is the perfection of sensible cognition as such’.25
He goes on to argue that the ‘universal’ beauty of sensible cognition consists
of the beauty of appearance, order, and signification, though both volumes
of the Aesthetics that Baumgarten managed to publish are devoted to the
beauty of appearance, which concerns ‘the agreement of cognitions among
themselves’.26 The two volumes describe the richness, greatness, truth, clar-
ity, and life of beautiful sensible cognition, which, according to Baumgarten,
‘comprise the perfection of every cognition, insofar as they are in agreement
with one another in a representation’.27
The implications of Baumgarten’s claim that confused sensible cognition
possesses its own perfection, which is different from the perfection of distinct
intellectual cognition should not be underestimated. The Leibnizian-Wolffian
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philosophy had suggested that sensible and intellectual cognition were es-
sentially continuous with one another and only differed in degrees of clarity
and distinctness.28 Wolff was also confident that the confusion of sensible
cognition could be resolved through logical analysis.29 By declaring that sen-
sible and intellectual cognition differed not only in degrees of clarity and
distinctness, but also in their respective perfections, Baumgarten dissolved
the continuity between the lower and higher cognitive faculties that had been
an essential part of his predecessors’ rationalism. The result is a dualism of
sensible and intellectual cognition and of aesthetics and logic – the two kinds
of cognition and the two sciences differ in kind and not merely in degree.30 To
be sure, Baumgarten’s dualism is qualified by his insistence that sensibility is
the ‘analogue of reason’ and that aesthetics is the ‘art of the analogue of rea-
son’.31 This suggests that the lower and higher cognitive faculties are similar,
despite their differences. Like reason, sensibility gives rise to a kind of cog-
nition that is defined by the degree of its clarity and distinctness. And while
it possesses a lower degree of distinctness than intellectual cognition, sensible
cognition is no less valuable than intellectual cognition – Baumgarten em-
phasizes this point repeatedly in the ‘Prolegomena’ to the Aesthetics, where
he stresses that both kinds of cognition can be cultivated without detriment
to sensibility or reason.32
Clearly, Baumgarten does not think we have to choose between the sci-
ences of aesthetics and logic, despite the differences in the faculties and the
kinds of cognitions with which they are concerned. On the contrary, he thinks
that both sciences should be pursued, so that the sensible and intellectual
cognition with which they are concerned can both be brought to a state of
perfection. Yet it can be argued that he opens the door to the much stronger
form of dualism that the pre-critical Kant advocates in his inaugural disser-
tation On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible Worlds.
In his inaugural dissertation, Kant denies the analogy between sensible and
intellectual cognition, insisting that they do not differ in degrees of clarity
and distinctness, but rather in their origin – the faculties of sensibility and
the understanding – as well as in their objects – phenomena and noumena
– and in the way they represent those objects – ‘as they appear’ and ‘as
they are’, respectively. The pre-critical Kant thinks these distinctions are
so important that he presents his inaugural dissertation as a ‘propaedeutic
science . . . which teaches the distinction between sensible cognition and the
cognition that derives from the understanding’, so that everything associated
with the faculty of sensibility, sensible cognition, phenomena, and appear-
ances can be excluded from the science of metaphysics, which he understands
as ‘the philosophy which contains the first principles of the use of the pure
understanding . . . ’.33 Baumgarten never would have accepted such a radi-
cal distinction between sensible and intellectual cognition, or the exclusion
of sensible cognition from metaphysics that Kant insists upon. However, it
is one possible consequence of the claim that sensible and intellectual cogni-
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tion are different in kind and have separate perfections, which is central to
Baumgarten’s distinction between aesthetics and logic.34
III. THE CRITIQUE OF TASTE
Although he used Baumgarten’s Metaphysics as a textbook in his lectures for
forty years, and radicalises Baumgarten’s distinction between sensible and
intellectual cognition in his inaugural dissertation, Immanuel Kant is a harsh
critic of Baumgarten’s aesthetics. Kant articulates this critique in his pub-
lished works; in his lectures on logic, metaphysics, and anthropology; and
in handwritten notes and fragments, known as Reflexionen, from both the
pre-critical and critical periods. And while the objections he raises against
Baumgarten’s new science are remarkably consistent throughout his career,
Kant’s own views on aesthetics changed dramatically shortly before he pub-
lished the Critique of the Power of Judgment in 1790.
Kant’s critique of Baumgarten’s aesthetics during the pre-critical period
is nicely summarised in a footnote to the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ in the
first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason. While Kant acknowledges that
his own use of the term ‘aesthetic’ derives from Baumgarten, he is careful to
distinguish his own ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’ from the Baumgarten’s new
science. Kant defines the ‘transcendental aesthetic’ as ‘a science of all princi-
ples of a priori sensibility’, which identifies the pure forms of intuition – space
and time – as both a priori principles of a science of metaphysics and a priori
conditions of the possibility of experience. He objects to Baumgarten’s use of
the term, because he thinks Baumgarten conflates aesthetics with ‘that which
others call the critique of taste’.35 The difference between aesthetics and the
critique of taste is important, for Kant, because he thinks Baumgarten’s hope
‘of bringing the critical estimation of the beautiful under principles and ele-
vating its rules to a science’ is ‘futile’.36 Kant denies that there could ever be
a ‘science’ of taste, since ‘the putative rules or criteria are merely empirical
as far as their sources are concerned, and can therefore never serve as a priori
rules according to which our judgment of taste must be directed . . . ’.37
In other words, Kant thinks a science of aesthetics is impossible, because
judgements of taste are based on empirical principles, rather than a priori
rules. Similar arguments can be found in a number of Kant’s Reflexionen
and in the transcripts of his lectures from the 1770s, where he often uses
the distinction between science and critique to explain the difference between
logic and aesthetics. Kant maintains that logic is a science because it is based
on a priori principles, while aesthetics is merely a critique, since judgements
of taste are derived from experience.38 This way of distinguishing science and
critique is difficult to reconcile with Kant’s ‘critique of pure reason’, which
he calls ‘a special science’, and whose object, ‘pure reason’, contains ‘the
principles for cognizing something absolutely a priori’.39 Yet it seems that
Kant could never accept the possibility that aesthetics could be a science,
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even after he claimed to have discovered a priori principles of judgements of
taste. In the third Critique, where he declares that ‘the judgment of taste
rests on a priori grounds’, Kant still insists that ‘there can be no science of
the beautiful, only a critique’, because ‘if the former existed, then it would be
determined scientifically, i.e., by means of proofs, whether something should
be held to be beautiful or not; thus the judgment about beauty, if it belonged
to a science, would not be a judgment of taste’.40
Kant’s reasons for denying that there could be a scientific proof that some-
thing is beautiful in the third Critique are based on a new conception of aes-
thetics that he introduces at the beginning of the ‘Analytic of the Beautiful’.
There Kant maintains that judgements of taste are different from cognitive
and moral judgements, because they aesthetic. In this context, ‘aesthetic’
means that the ‘determining grounds’ of judgements of taste ‘cannot be other
than subjective’.41 Kant goes on to argue that ‘any relation of representations
. . . even that of sensations, can be objective (in which case it signifies what
is real in an empirical representation); but not the relation to the feeling of
pleasure and displeasure, by means of which nothing at all in the object is
designated, but in which the subject feels itself as it is affected by the repre-
sentation’.42 This means that judgements of taste are aesthetic because they
are concerned with purely subjective feelings of pleasure and displeasure. The
differences between this conception of aesthetics and Baumgarten’s are worth
noting.
Baumgarten defines aesthetics as the science of sensible cognition. Kant
himself had appropriated this conception of aesthetics for the ‘Transcendental
Aesthetic’ in the first Critique, though he limited its scope to include only
‘principles of a priori sensibility’ – the pure forms of intuition, space and
time. Yet, in the third Critique, he insists that aesthetics is not concerned
with sensibility but with feeling. Not only does Kant emphasise the difference
between sensibility and feeling that he draws in the passage I have already
quoted, but he also says sensibility is objective, because it corresponds to
what is real in empirical representation, while feeling is subjective, because
it refers only to the way the subject is affected by a representation. He goes
on to sharply distinguish agreeable sensations from the feeling of aesthetic
pleasure in the pages that follow. Kant defines the ‘agreeable’, as ‘that which
pleases the senses in sensation’, but he denies that aesthetic pleasure is the
same as agreeableness or that it is grounded in sensation, because sensible
representations are always ‘related to the object’ – they constitute the content
of our cognition of objects.43 Aesthetic pleasure is a feeling that is ‘related
solely to the subject, and does not serve for cognition at all, not even that by
which the subject cognizes itself’, so it cannot arise from a cognitive faculty
like sensibility.44 Nor can it be related to an object in any way. Instead,
in one of the more curious passages in the third Critique, Kant argues that
feelings of aesthetic pleasure are actually grounded in judgements of taste,
because, in judgements of taste, the imagination and the understanding stand
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in a relation of ‘free play’, in which each faculty is active, and they harmo-
niously interact, without being determined by the concepts that are necessary
for cognitive and moral judgements.45 The animation and enlivening of the
faculties through free play is the source of the feeling of aesthetic pleasure.
An interesting consequence of the subjectivism of Kant’s new conception
of aesthetics is that he rejects the concept of aesthetic perfection. Kant
had often employed this concept in his lectures on logic, metaphysics, and
anthropology during the 1770s, where he followed Baumgarten and Meier
in distinguishing between the aesthetic and logical perfections of cognition –
though he also modified their distinction in interesting ways. In the transcript
of one of his lectures on logic from the 1770s, for example, Kant argues that
the aesthetic perfection of cognition is subjective, while the logical perfection
of cognition is objective.46 In the same transcript, he asserts that aesthetically
perfect cognition ‘has an effect on our feeling and our taste’, though he also
says that aesthetic perfection ‘is a perfection according to laws of sensibility’,
which suggests that he had not yet distinguished sensibility and feeling as
clearly as he would in the third Critique.47
In the same transcript, Kant indicates that aesthetic and logical perfection
are mutually exclusive, so that ‘one has to sacrifice some logical perfection if
one wants to attain an aesthetic perfection, and one has to give up some aes-
thetic perfection if one wants to attain a logical perfection’.48 This is similar
to a claim Kant makes in the first Critique, where he argues that the ‘bright
colors’ of examples and illustrations ‘paint over and make unrecognizable the
structure of the system, which yet matters most when it comes to judging
its unity and soundness’, though, in the first Critique, he associates examples
and illustrations with ‘aesthetic clarity’ and the conceptual articulation of the
structure of a system with ‘logical clarity’, rather than aesthetic and logical
‘perfection’.49
By the time he published the third Critique, it seems that Kant had
purged even these last vestiges of the concept of aesthetic perfection from
his critical philosophy. Kant explains his reasons for rejecting this concept
most clearly in a remark included in the unpublished ‘First Introduction’ to
the third Critique, where he argues that perfection is ‘an ontological concept’
that pertains to ‘mere completeness of the many, insofar as together it con-
stitutes a one’, which is the same concept ‘as that of the totality (allness) of
something composite’.50 As such, the concept of perfection ‘has not the least
to do with the feeling of pleasure or displeasure’, which is to be identified
with ‘the representation of a subjective purposiveness of an object’.51 Kant
defends the same view in § 15 of the ‘Analytic of the Beautiful’, where he
declares that ‘the judgment of taste is entirely independent from the con-
cept of perfection’.52 His defence of this claim rests on the premise that ‘the
judgment of taste is an aesthetic judgment, i.e., one that rests on subjective
grounds, and its determining ground cannot be a concept, and thus not a
concept of a determinate end’.53 ‘Thus’, he concludes, ‘by beauty, as a formal
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subjective purposiveness, there is not conceived any perfection of the object
as a supposedly formal but yet also objective purposiveness . . . ’.54 In neither
of these passages does Kant consider the possibility that aesthetic perfection
could be a perfection of cognition rather than a perfection of the object, even
though Baumgarten clearly understood aesthetic perfection in these terms,
and Kant himself had described it in these terms in his lectures. Yet it would
not have made a difference if he had – the subjectivism of Kant’s new con-
ception of aesthetics, and the distinctions he draws between aesthetic and
cognitive judgements, would have led Kant to reject cognitive conceptions of
aesthetic perfection just as decisively as he excluded ontological conceptions
of perfection from aesthetics in the third Critique.
IV. THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART
Kant’s third Critique was read with great interest by the German romantics
and idealists, who found it inspiring as well as challenging. They objected to
the subjectivism of Kant’s aesthetics, its emphasis on feeling, and its cursory
discussion of the fine arts. Yet they soon began to appropriate and trans-
form Kant’s critical aesthetics in much the same way that Kant appropriated
and transformed Baumgarten’s new science. It is through this process of
appropriation and transformation that Kant’s critique of taste comes to be
supplanted by the philosophy of art.
The idea of a philosophy of art can be traced back to Friedrich Wilhelm
Joseph Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism (1800). In that work,
Schelling treats the philosophy of art as the third part of a philosophical sys-
tem that is divided between transcendental philosophy and the philosophy
of nature. These two parts of philosophy are distinguished by the principles
they take as their starting points – transcendental philosophy begins with the
subjective self-consciousness of the I, while the philosophy of nature begins
with the unconscious objectivity of nature. The philosophy of art constitutes
the third part of this system, because Schelling regards the work of art as the
embodiment of the free, conscious activity of the subject in the unconscious,
objective material of nature. Indeed, he thinks that art is the primary way
in which we come to know ‘the absolute’ – the unity that contains within
itself the opposition between subject and object, consciousness and the un-
conscious, self and nature, and negates their difference.55
Schelling continues to develop this conception of art in a series of lectures
that he delivers in Jena (1802-1803) and Würzburg (1804-1805) shortly after
the publication of his System. In these lectures, Schelling argues that art
is worthy of philosophical reflection, precisely because ‘a true construction
of art presents its forms as forms of things as they are in themselves, or as
they are within the absolute’.56 While most of the lectures are devoted to
discussions of music, painting, sculpture, and poetry as different ‘forms’ of
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art, Schelling also distinguishes the philosophy of art from aesthetics and the
critique of taste more explicitly in his lectures than he had in the System.
In the ‘Introduction’, for example, he argues that the philosophy of art ‘can
by no means be compared with anything that has existed up to the present
under the name of aesthetics, theory of the fine arts and sciences, or any other
designation’.57 While he acknowledges that in Baumgarten’s ‘most general
principles . . . there still inhered at least the trace of the idea of the beautiful
as that archetypal element appearing in the concrete and reflected world’, he
also thinks that, after Baumgarten, aesthetics
‘has acquired an ever more definite dependency on the moral and
the useful, just as in psychological theories certain phenomena
have been explained away more or less like ghost stories or similar
superstitions, until Kantian formalism, following upon all this,
bore a new and higher view, though also a host of artistically
empty doctrines of art’.58
Schelling does not elaborate on his remarks about Kant in this passage, but
presumably he thinks Kantian formalism leads to ‘artistically empty doctrines
of art’ because it limits itself to merely subjective judgements of taste and
denies the possibility of the ‘complete and totally objective view of art’ that
Schelling seeks to present in his philosophy of art.59 Aesthetics and the cri-
tique of taste are inadequate, for Schelling, because they fail to see that art
reflects ‘the inner essence’ of philosophy – the search for the absolute.
This hostility to aesthetics and the critique of taste is also evident in a
series of lectures that Hegel delivered on the philosophy of art in Heidel-
berg (1818) and Berlin (1820-1821, 1823, 1826, 1829-1830). Although Hegel’s
lectures were delivered under the title ‘Aesthetics, or Philosophy of Art’ (Aes-
thetischen sive philosophiam artis), and this title was subsequently given to
the volumes of Hegel’s collected works that were published by his former stu-
dent, Heinrich Gustav Hotho, on this subject in 1835, Hegel himself found the
title inappropriate. In the published text, Hegel notes that the subject matter
of his lectures will be ‘the spacious realm of the beautiful’ and, more precisely,
‘art, or, rather, fine art’.60 He explains that ‘for this topic, it is true, the
word Aesthetics, taken literally, is not wholly satisfactory, since “Aesthetics”
means, more precisely, the science of sensation, of feeling’, which
‘had its origin as a new science, or rather as something which
for the first time was to become a philosophical discipline, in the
school of Wolff at the period in Germany when works of art were
treated with regard to the feelings they were supposed to produce,
as, for instance, the feeling of pleasure, admiration, fear, pity, and
so on’.61
Because the ‘unsatisfactoriness, or more accurately, the superficiality’ of this
conception of aesthetics was so apparent, Hegel mentions that ‘attempts were
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made after all to frame others’, including ‘Callistics’, though these were sim-
ilarly inadequate, since they did not sufficiently distinguish between beauty
– kalos, in Ancient Greek – and the beauty of art.62 Hegel allows the title
‘Aesthetics’ to stand, since names are matters of indifference and the term
had become conventional in the preceding century; yet he insists that the
beauty of fine art is a matter of special interest for philosophers. Accord-
ing to Hegel, fine art is something ‘free’ and ‘self-conscious’, meaning that
it is self-determining and self-comprehending. That is why Hegel thinks the
beauty of fine art is something ‘higher than nature’.63
Natural phenomena are determined by external causes, rather than an
internal principle, so nature is not free in the same way as art. Hegel also
thinks art is capable of expressing a kind of truth that cannot be found in
nature, since nature is not self-conscious. The ‘truth’ of art is, for Hegel,
the comprehension of the whole that art contains within itself. Religion and
philosophy are also capable of expressing this kind of truth, but they do so
intellectually. Art is special, and has a certain priority with respect to religion
and philosophy, because the truth of art appears, and is first comprehended,
through the senses. In his lectures, Hegel will even define art as the ‘sensuous
appearance’ of ‘the idea’, where ‘appearance’ refers to the manifestation of
truth and ‘the idea’ is the unity of the whole that is comprehended through the
senses in art.64 And though he famously says that, in his time, ‘thought and
reflection have taken their flight above fine art’, so that ‘art is, and remains for
us, on the side of its highest destiny, a thing of the past’, he credits art with
elevating human consciousness to the point where it is capable of religious
insight, philosophical speculation, and, indeed, absolute knowledge.65
In addition to their shared interest in art, Schelling and Hegel also employ
similar conceptions of philosophy in their philosophy of art. Both affirm that
the philosophy of art is a ‘science’ and that it is ‘critical’, but they also defend
a holistic conception of philosophy that goes far beyond anything Baumgarten
or Kant would have recognized. In the ‘Introduction’ to The Critical Journal
of Philosophy (1802-1803), which they co-edited, Schelling and Hegel argue
that ‘the possibility of essentially distinct yet equally true philosophies’ is not
worthy of serious consideration, because ‘philosophy is but one, and can only
be one’, since ‘reason is but one; and there cannot be distinct reasons . . . for
reason, absolutely considered, and reason when it becomes object for itself in
its self-cognition (and hence philosophy) is again just one and the same thing
. . . ’.66
While Schelling acknowledges that there are ‘many philosophies’ and ‘var-
ious philosophical sciences or philosophical theories’ in the ‘Introduction’ to
his lectures on the philosophy art, he still insists that there is ultimately ‘only
one philosophy and one science of philosophy’, because ‘there is actually and
essentially only one essence, one absolute reality, and this essence, as abso-
lute, is indivisible, such that it cannot change over into other essences by
means of division or separation.’67 The only way for there to be particular
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philosophical sciences, like the philosophy of art, is for ‘the one and undi-
vided whole of philosophy’ to be posited under special determinations that
Schelling calls ‘potences’ (Potenzen).68 He explains that these ‘potences’ refer
‘to the general proposition of philosophy concerning the essential and inner
identity of all things and of all that we are able to discern and distinguish in
general.’69 While they posit that essential unity of all things, as the ‘general
proposition’ of philosophy requires, potences present different views on that
unity, so that it can be understood as God, nature, history, or even art.70
Schelling maintains that ‘philosophy emerges in its most complete manifes-
tation only within the totality of all potences’, so the philosophy of art is
not complete or self-sufficient; yet its content is, in the end, no different from
that of any other ‘potence’, since art is just one of the ‘determinations’ under
which philosophy tries to comprehend the absolute unity of all things.71
Hegel defends a similar conception of philosophy in his Phenomenology of
Spirit, which was published just a few years later. In the Phenomenology,
Hegel presents a ‘science of the experience of consciousness’ that proceeds
through the various ‘shapes’ (Gestalten) in which consciousness appears to
itself.72 In a manner reminiscent of Schelling’s ‘potences’, Hegel understands
each of these ‘shapes’ to be particular determinations of the absolute. The
Phenomenology culminates in a chapter on ‘absolute knowledge’, which is
nothing other than the complete comprehension of all the different determi-
nations of consciousness and self-consciousness that have preceded it. Art is
one of the ‘shapes’ that Hegel discusses in the chapter immediately before
the conclusion of the Phenomenology. In fact, Hegel credits art with ‘engen-
dering’, or ‘giving form to’, the external shape in which the absolute appears
to itself for the first time.73 Hegel expands upon this view in the ‘Introduc-
tion’ to the lectures on aesthetics, where he argues that fine art is worthy of
‘science’ and ‘philosophy’ precisely because it is one of the ways in which the
absolute appears and through which it can be comprehended.74
V. AMBIGUITIES AND CONTRADICTIONS
The account of the differences between the science of aesthetics, the critique
of taste, and the philosophy of art in German philosophy at the end of the
eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century that I have
proposed here is brief and schematic. There are important figures and works
that it does not mention, the way it reconstructs philosophical debates is too
broad and general, and it proceeds without evaluating the merits of the claims
and arguments being advanced by the different parties to the dispute. Still,
I think it shows that philosophers during that time were asking important
questions about the subject matter of aesthetics – is it concerned with sensible
cognition, judgements of taste, feelings of aesthetic pleasure, or the nature of
art? – as well as its status – is it a science, a critique, or a philosophy? And
they were engaging in debates about these questions that define the ways in
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which aesthetics will be understood in the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-
first centuries. It should also be noted that the outcome of these debates
is not entirely satisfactory, because, instead of resolving their disagreements
through the exchange or reasons, by demonstrating the veracity of truths
and refuting falsehoods, later philosophers begin to conflate the science of
aesthetics, the critique of taste, and the philosophy of art with one another.
A lengthier and more detailed history would be necessary to recount all the
complex ways in which their differences are obscured by different philosophers,
in different places and times, and in different institutional contexts, over the
course of the last three hundred years. But I think the schematic account
I have provided is sufficient for us to identify several of the ambiguities and
contradictions that have plagued aesthetics since its inception.
The ambiguous status of aesthetics in contemporary philosophy is, I think,
partly a result of the controversies surrounding its origin. Debates about
whether aesthetics is a science, a critique of taste, or a philosophy of art
may seem old fashioned now, since many analytic philosophers in the twen-
tieth century were either indifferent to or explicitly rejected the systematic
ambitions of nineteenth century German philosophy, including its need to
define the method and status of philosophical inquiry. Even when analytic
philosophers shared the interests of their German predecessors in ‘scientific’
philosophy, they often understood ‘science’ in very different ways.75 Still, de-
bates about the nature of science, and the scientific status of philosophy were
central to the origins of aesthetics. And it is helpful to know why philosophers
like Baumgarten, Kant, Schelling, and Hegel took the positions they did on
these issues.
Baumgarten thinks aesthetics is a science because it provides knowledge
of its object – sensible cognition. Kant is consistent about denying the pos-
sibility of a science of aesthetics, and identifying aesthetics with the critique
of taste, though he does so for very different reasons at different times in his
career. Before he published the second edition of the first Critique in 1787,
Kant denies that aesthetics could be a science because he thinks judgements
of taste are empirical and lack a priori principles. After 1787, when he claims
to have discovered a priori principles of judgements of taste, Kant denies that
aesthetics can be a science because its principles are merely subjective – they
concern subjective feelings of pleasure and displeasure. Schelling and Hegel
reject the claim that aesthetics is an empirical or subjective critique of taste,
because they insist that art contains objective, philosophical content. Indeed,
they see art as a particular determination of the absolute, which is the ulti-
mate object of all philosophical inquiry. To the extent that philosophers can
comprehend the absolute through art, they think it is appropriate to iden-
tify the philosophy of art as a kind of philosophy. None of these three views
have been conclusively demonstrated to be true, nor have any of them been
decisively refuted, but they still persist, in different ways, in contemporary
philosophy.
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Disagreements about the subject matter of aesthetics are, perhaps, more
difficult to ignore than debates about its status. Few contemporary philoso-
phers accept Baumgarten’s original conception of aesthetics as a science of
sensible cognition, perhaps because the Platonic distinction between the sensi-
ble and the intellectual no longer has a great deal of currency in contemporary
metaphysics and epistemology. Still, there have been noteworthy attempts to
revive Baumgarten’s original conception of aesthetics in recent years, which
suggest that aesthetics need not limit itself to art, beauty, or taste, but can
engage with a broader range of problems in perceptual psychology.76 Kant’s
conception of aesthetics as a critique of taste is more popular among contem-
porary philosophers, though relatively few contemporary philosophers believe
there are a priori rules for judgements of taste. Nevertheless, some contempo-
rary philosophers defend a view that resembles Kant’s pre-critical aesthetics,
David Hume’s reflections on the standard of taste, or Edmund Burke’s quasi-
physiological explanation of taste.77 In these accounts, experience provides
helpful instruction, but not universal and necessary laws, for judgements of
aesthetic value. Even fewer contemporary philosophers think of art as a de-
terminate form in which the absolute appears, though many think art remains
a worthwhile object of philosophical inquiry – more so than beauty or taste,
which privilege sensation and feeling in ways that neglect the “intellectual
activity” and “conceptual enterprise” involved in art.78 Again, the philoso-
phers who advocate making sense perception, judgements of taste, or works
of art the object of aesthetics do not really argue with one another – they
do not try to prove that their views are correct or that others are incorrect.
Instead, they pursue different research agendas that do not overlap, and, as
such, do not come into conflict with one another. That is all well and good,
if one’s goal is to pursue specialiced academic research, present one’s work at
conferences, and publish articles in scholarly journals. Problems only arise
when one is trying to formulate a coherent account of aesthetics as a disci-
pline, defend particular views of its subject matter, and justify the methods
it employs.
I suspect that aesthetics is not unique in experiencing these problems. His-
torians of philosophy could almost certainly discover similar ambiguities and
contradictions in logic, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, political philoso-
phy, and the rest of the subdisciplines recognized by contemporary academic
philosophy. One of the benefits of studying the origins of aesthetics, and
the controversies about its subject matter and status, is that it provides a
model for understanding how philosophical systems are ‘really’ articulated –
how their parts are distinguished from one another, the kinds of objections to
which those distinctions are subject, how these disputes are managed within
the discipline, and which views become institutionalised over time. On all






1To be sure, other factors also con-
tribute to the marginalisation of aesthet-
ics. See Ribeiro 2014.
2While Nickolas Pappas recognizes the
anachronism of attributing an ‘aesthetic’
theory to Plato, he thinks Plato can still
be described as ‘seeking to discover the vo-
cabulary and issues of aesthetics’. See Pap-
pas 2017.
3Aristotle 1984, 4624, 4965.
4Umberto Eco rejects this view, and de-
fends the concept of a medieval aesthetics,
in Eco 2002, 1-3.
5Pseudo-Dionysius 1987, 55.
6See Gracia 1992, 113-120. See also
Aertsen 1991, 68-97.
7Although they remain classic studies
of the origins of aesthetics, I regard Croce
1922 (1901) and Baeumler 1967 (1923) as
deeply anachronistic. The chapter on aes-
thetics in Cassirer 1951 (1932) is consid-
erably more accurate. Recent studies like
Beiser 2009, Buchenau’s The Founding of
Aesthetics in the German Enlightenment,
Guyer 2014, and Grote 2017 are, in my
view, far superior to earlier treatments of
the origins of aesthetics. For my own view,
see McQuillan 2015, 101-133.
8Baumgarten 1954.
9Baumgarten 1954.
10Baumgarten 1954, § 9.
11Baumgarten 1954, § 1.
12Baumgarten 1954, § 3-§ 4.
13Baumgarten 1954, § 7-§ 8.
14Baumgarten 1954, § 9, § 115.
15Baumgarten 1954, § 116.
16Baumgarten 1954, § 115.
17Baumgarten 2013.
18Baumgarten 1954, § 115-§ 116.
19Baumgarten 2013, § 533.
20Baumgarten 1983, 69.
21Baumgarten 2007, Bd.1, § 1.
22Meier 1976, Bd.1, § 2.
23Baumgarten 1973, § 2.
24Baumgarten 1954, § 27; Baumgarten
2013, § 532.
25Baumgarten 2007, Bd.1, § 14.
26Baumgarten 2007, Bd.1, § 18.
27Baumgarten 2007, Bd.1, § 22.
28For an overview, see McQuillan 2017,
149-159.
29See Wolff 2003, § 17-§ 18.
30This dualism is apparent in Baum-
garten 1954, § 115-§ 116.
31Baumgarten 2013, § 533, § 640; Baum-
garten 2007, Bd.1, § 1.
32See, for example, Baumgarten 2013, §
7-§ 9.
33Kant 1992b, § 8.




38See, for example, Kant 2005, 30, 209.
See also Kant 1992a, 530.
39Kant 1998, A11/B24.
40Kant 2000, § 12, § 44.
41Kant 2000, § 1.
42Kant 2000, § 1.
43Kant 2000, § 3.
44Kant 2000, § 3.




49Kant 1998, Axvii-Axviii Note that the
word translated by Guyer and Wood as
‘clarity’ is actually Deutlichkeit, which is
usually rendered as ‘distinctness’. Kant’s
reference to aesthetic distinctness is novel
and rather confusing, especially because,
in the Blomberg Logic, he follows Baum-
garten in maintaining that aesthetic per-
fection ‘is sensed only in confused con-
cepts, and it loses its value just as soon
as the concept is made distinct (deutlich)’.
See Kant 1992a, 36.
50Kant 2000, 37.
51Kant 2000, 38.
52Kant 2000, § 15.
53Kant 2000, § 15.
54Kant 2000, § 15.
55Schelling 1978, 229-230. See also
Schelling’s correspondence with Fichte in
Vater and Wood 2012, 45.
159
The Science of Aesthetics, the Critique of Taste, and the
Philosophy of Art: Ambiguities and Contradictions




60Hegel 1975, Vol. 1, 1.
61Hegel 1975, Vol. 1, 1.
62Hegel 1975, Vol. 1, 1.
63Hegel 1975, Vol. 1, 2.
64Hegel 1975, Vol. 1, 10, 12, 36-41.
65Hegel 1975, Vol. 1, 11.






72Hegel 2018, § 5.
73Hegel 2018, § 702-§ 703.
74Hegel 1975, Vol. 1, 2-25.
75See, for example, Russell 1914, 3-32.
76See, for example, Nanay 2016, 1-8.




Aertsen, Jan. 1991. “Beauty in the Middle Ages: A Forgotten Transcenden-
tal?” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 1:68–97.
Aristotle. 1984. Complete Works. Edited by Jonathan Barnes. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Baeumler, Alfred. 1967. Das Irrationalitätsproblem in der Ästhetik und
Logik des 18. Jahrhunderts bis zur Kritik der Urteilskraft. Darmstadt:
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.
Baumgarten, Alexander Gottlieb. 1954. Reflections on Poetry. Edited by
Karl Aschenbrenner and William B. Holther. Translated by Karl As-
chenbrenner and William B. Holther. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
. 1973. Acroasis Logica. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag.
. 1983. Texte zur Grundlegung der Ästhetik. Edited by Hans Rudolf
Schweizer. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag.
. 2007. Ästhetik. Edited by Dagmar Mirbach. Translated by Dagmar
Mirbach. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag.
. 2013. Metaphysics: A Critical Translation with Kant’s Elucidations,
Selected Notes, and Related Materials. Edited by Courtney D. Fugate
and John Hymers. Translated by Courtney D. Fugate and John Hymers.
London: Bloomsbury.
Beiser, Fredrick C. 2009. Diotima’s Children: German Aesthetic Rationalism
from Leibniz to Lessing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cassirer, Ernst. 1951. The Philosophy of the Enlightenment. Translated




Croce, Benedetto. 1922. Aesthetic as Science of Expression and General
Linguistic. 2nd. Translated by Douglas Ainslie. London: Macmillan and
Co.
Danto, Arthur. 1983. “Art, Philosophy, and the Philosophy of Art.” Hu-
manities 4 (1): 1–2.
Di Giovanni, George, and Harris. 2000. Between Kant & Hegel: Texts in the
Development of Post-Kantian Idealism. Revised edition. Indianapolis:
Hackett Publishing.
Eco, Umberto. 2002. Art and Beauty in the Middle Ages. Translated by
Hugh Bredlin. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Gracia, J.J.E. 1992. “The Transcendentals in the Middle Ages: An Intro-
duction.” Topoi 11:113–120.
Grote, Simon. 2017. The Emergence of Modern Aesthetic Theory: Reli-
gion and Morality in Enlightenment Germany and Scotland. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Guyer, Paul. 2014. A History of Modern Aesthetics. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Hegel, G.W.F. 1975. Hegel’s Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art. Translated
by T.M. Knox. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
. 2018. The Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by Terry Pinkard.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kant, Immanuel. 1992a. Lectures on Logic. Edited by J. Michael Young.
Translated by J. Michael Young. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
. 1992b. Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770. Edited by David Walford
and Ralf Meerbote. Translated by David Walford and Ralf Meerbote.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
. 1998. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Paul Guyer and
Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
. 2000. Critique of the Power of Judgment. Translated by Paul Guyer
and Eric Matthews. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
. 2005. Notes and Fragments. Edited by Paul Guyer. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Kivy, Peter. 2015. De Gustibus: Arguing about Taste and Why We Do it.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Korsmeyer, Carolyn. 2010. Making Sense of Taste: Food and Philosophy.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
McQuillan, J. Colin. 2015. Early Modern Aesthetics. London: Rowman &
Littlefield International.
161
The Science of Aesthetics, the Critique of Taste, and the
Philosophy of Art: Ambiguities and Contradictions
. 2017. In Clarity and Distinctness in Eighteenth Century Germany:
Metaphysics, Logic, Aesthetics, edited by Manuel Sánchez Rodríguez and
Miguel Escribano Cabeza. Themata.
. 2019. “The Remarriage of Reason and Experience in Kant’s Critique
of Pure Reason.” Epoché 24 (1): 53–69.
Meier, Georg Friedrich. 1976. Anfangsgründe aller schönen Wissenschaften.
Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag.
Nanay, Bence. 2016. Aesthetics as Philosophy of Perception. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Pappas, Nickolas. 2017. Plato’s Aesthetics. https://plato.stanford.
edu/entries/plato-aesthetics/.
Pseudo-Dionysius. 1987. The Complete Works. Translated by Colm Luib-
heid. New York: Paulist Press.
Ribeiro, Anna Christina. 2014. Aesthetics’ Philosophical Im-
portance. https://aestheticsforbirds.com/2014/03/22/
aesthetics-philosophical-importance-by-anna-christina-ribeiro/.
Russell, Bertrand. 1914. Our Knowledge of the External World as a Field
for Scientific Method in Philosophy. London/Chicago: Open Court.
Schelling, F.W.J. 1978. System of Transcendental Idealism. Translated by
Peter Heath. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia.
. 1989. The Philosophy of Art. Edited by Douglas W. Stott. Trans-
lated by Douglas W. Stott. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Vater, Michael G., and David Wood. 2012. The Philosophical Rupture be-
tween Fichte and Schelling: Selected Texts and Correspondence. Albany:
State University of New York Press.
Wolff, Christian. 2003. Logic, or Rational Thoughts on the Powers of the
Human Understanding. Gesammelte Werke (III. Abt., Bd. 77). Edited
by Jean École et al. Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag.
COPYRIGHT:
© 2021 J. Colin McQuillan
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC-BY 4.0), which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the
original author and source are credited.
See https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Aesthetic Investigations is a peer-reviewed open access journal published by
the Dutch Association of Aesthetics.
162
